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Abstract
Can international institutions help leaders commit economic reform? In this article, we ex-
amine how leaders use preferential trading agreements with major powers (European Union and
the United States) to promote liberal economic policies. We argue that under democratization,
new leaders benefit the most from credible commitment. Using original data on treaty negotia-
tions, our empirical analysis shows that under democratization, leader change greatly increases
the probability that the government of a developing country begins treaty negotiations. We
also demonstrate that preferential trading agreements are accompanied by liberalization in dif-
ferent sectors of the economy, and this effect is most pronounced if it follows a leader change.
These findings support the notion that international institutions enable credible commitment to
economic reform.
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International relations scholars argue that domestic politics exerts substantial influence on inter-
national cooperation (McGillivray and Smith, 2006; Smith, 2009). To explain why a leader joins
or forms an international institution, it is therefore necessary to understand how this decision
impinges on domestic politics. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the role of international
institutions in a leader’s political calculus remains scant. Many scholars argue that states benefit
from membership in international institutions, such as the European Union (EU) or the World
Trade Organization (WTO), in the form of credible commitment (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Mans-
field and Pevehouse, 2006; Moravcsik, 2000). However, these studies do not empirically verify the
presence of the posited causal mechanism: an individual leader ties her hands, thus mitigating
time-inconsistency problems that impede such reforms as democratization or liberalization.
In this article, we examine how individual leaders can use international institutions for political
gain. We focus on why developing countries form preferential trading agreements (PTAs) with the
United States (US) or the European Union (EU).1 Our theoretical argument can be summarized
as follows. First, democratization increases the demand for economic reform because the public
benefits from improved economic performance (Milner and Kubota, 2005; Weyland, 2002).2 Second,
it is difficult for new leaders to implement economic reforms because their rule is not secure and
vested distributional interests oppose liberalization (Cheibub, 1998; Haggard and Kaufman, 1997;
Hellman, 1998). Finally, a PTA with a major power can help a new leader promote economic
reform in two ways: (i) by enabling a credible commitment to reform policies and (ii) by allowing
the government to use the promise of foreign market access to compensate domestic opponents for
their losses (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Ethier, 1998; Fernandez and Portes, 1998).3
Based on these three propositions, we expect that (i) the combination of democratization and
leader change increases the probability of PTA negotiations and (ii) PTA negotiations induce eco-
nomic reform in developing countries. We test this argument in two main ways.4 First, we use
1We will discuss the reasons why the EU and the US form PTAs in the theory section.
2Our definition of economic reform is not limited to trade policy, as explained in greater detail in the theory
section.
3In the theory section, we also explain why the EU and the US have incentives to form these PTAs.
4We also present extensive additional evidence on several ancillary implications of our theory.
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original data on the onset of PTA negotiations to verify that leader change has a substantively
large and statistically significant effect on the probability of PTA negotiations under democratiza-
tion. Second, we examine structural breaks in economic reform data for developing countries to
demonstrate that PTA negotiations and signature are both associated with liberalization shifts in
economic policy. This effect is maximized given recent leader change.
Beyond these main tests, we provide ample additional evidence in support of our theory. First,
we consider the alternative hypothesis that new leaders negotiate PTAs under democratization
simply because they want to expand trade. If this were true, one would expect new leaders under
democratization to also form other PTAs. By expanding our analysis to all PTAs in existence, we
find that leader change has a negative effect on PTA formation in general. Second, we show that
when a PTA is associated with economic reforms, these reforms are generally consolidated and will
not be reversed. Third, we conduct a matching analysis to address concerns regarding endogeneity
and non-random treatment effects. Fourth, we examine an ancillary implication of our theory:
democratization should prompt economic reforms in general, yet it should not be associated with
PTA negotiations. Finally, we summarize results from another research project showing that the
EU and US offer foreign aid to facilitate economic reforms when they form a PTA with a developing
country.
Our theoretical and empirical analysis offers several broader contributions to international co-
operation theory and political economy. First, we provide a direct empirical test of the role of
domestic politics in international institutionalization. While previous research has advanced vari-
ous theoretical arguments and tested them indirectly by investigating differences between various
regime types (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; McGillivray and Smith, 2004), we provide a direct
test that focuses squarely on how individual leaders respond to domestic hardship. Second, we con-
tribute to the study of PTA formation. While previous research has presented various theoretical
rationales from multilateral bargaining power to foreign direct investment (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008;
Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; Manger, 2009), international political economists have yet to con-
nect this logic to actual decisions made by strategic politicians under domestic political pressures.
Third, we refine the general logic of credible commitments in international politics. While previous
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scholarship has provided compelling evidence that enhanced credibility is an important benefit of
membership in international institutions (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006),
it has not been clear who the relevant audience is and exactly who benefits the most from these
credible commitments. Finally, we present original data on PTA negotiations. While previous
research on international institutionalization has largely focused on signature and ratification (Ko-
remenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002), we also capture the
negotiation phase.
2 Leaders, Domestic Politics, and International Institutions
International relations scholars have recently begun to emphasize the importance of individual lead-
ers as strategic actors in world politics (Goemans, 2008; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; McGillivray
and Smith, 2006; Wolford, 2007). While there are many issues that leaders must decide on, few
have drawn as much attention as political and economic reform (Keefer, 2007; Milner and Kubota,
2005; Stone, 2008; Vreeland, 2003). For any leader, one of the most important and controver-
sial policy choices available is to dismantle previously entrenched structures of redistribution and
discrimination in favor of liberalization (Geddes, 1994; Milner and Kubota, 2005; Schamis, 1999;
Weyland, 2002). Following decades of reform attempts in developing countries upon the demise
of import substitution as a development strategy, political economists have debated why leaders
sometimes succeed in reform, only to fail in other instances (Geddes, 1994; Haggard and Kaufman,
1997; Keefer, 2007; Przeworski, 1991; Rodrik, 1996; Schamis, 1999). According to this literature,
a critically important determinant of successful reform is the ability to compensate or suppress
the losers and mobilize the winners (Brooks and Kurtz, 2007; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Weyland,
2002).
As to the role of international institutions in the reform process, the literature emphasizes that
they provide a credible commitment device for leaders in need (Drazen, 2002; Mansfield and Peve-
house, 2006; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002).5 For example, Moravcsik (2000) argues
that young European democracies joined the European Convention for the Protection of Human
5Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) note that such credible commitments also carry reputational benefits.
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the aftermath of the Second World War to establish a cred-
ible commitment to democratic consolidation. With respect to economic reform, the problem is
particularly difficult because partial reforms may be difficult to finish, as “the short-term winners
have often sought to stall the economy in a partial reform equilibrium that generates concentrated
rents for themselves, while imposing high costs on the rest of society” (Hellman, 1998, 205). If a
leader can join an international institution, such as a PTA, to increase the reputational and other
costs of reneging on reforms, the probability of successful reform increases (Chayes and Chayes,
1995; Guzman, 2008; Tomz, 2007). Thus, if a leader believes he or she needs the reform to stay in
power, international institutions can in certain circumstances enable reform where it is otherwise
impossible.
Another reason why international institutions can promote economic reform is that they allow
leaders to compensate or coerce domestic constituencies. Vreeland (2003) shows that in developing
countries, governments have used IMF conditionalities to promote redistributive reforms that ben-
efit the capitalists. His argument is that the cost of saying no to the IMF can be very high, so that
domestic constituencies often have no choice but to implement the policy conditions negotiated
between the leader and the IMF. Similarly, Mattli and Plu¨mper (2004) argue that the prospect
of EU accession allows candidate governments to implement economic reforms at home. Their
main insight is that the benefits of EU accession allow the government to pass policies that would
otherwise be unacceptable to influential interest groups.
Although the theoretical connection between new leaders and international institutions is rea-
sonably clear in the extant literature, there are few systematic empirical analyses. McGillivray and
Smith (2004) demonstrate that leader turnover has a larger impact on trade in autocracies than
in democracies, but they do not focus on individual leaders’ actual policy decisions. Dreher and
Jensen (2009) show that new leaders vote with the US in the United Nations General Assembly to
establish friendly reputation and thus secure higher inflows of foreign aid, but they do not analyze
economic reform decisions. As mentioned above, Mattli and Plu¨mper (2004) and Vreeland (2003)
establish a connection between economic reform and international institutions. However, Mattli
and Plu¨mper (2004) focus only on EU accession while Vreeland (2003) focuses only on the IMF and
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argues that leaders actually implement economically harmful reforms. Thus, these studies do not
capture the possibility that a wide range of international institutions could facilitate economically
efficient reforms in developing countries.
These exceptions and the large literature on international conflict notwithstanding, most em-
pirical scholarship has not endogenized the role of leaders in exploiting international institutions
for credible commitment (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002;
Hafner-Burton, 2005). Instead, these articles focus on how states use international institutions for
credible commitment in general, abstracting away from the microanalytics of credible commitment
in the crossfire of domestic and international pressures.
The PTA literature also downplays individual leaders’ decisions. Fernandez and Portes (1998)
review the economic literature on reasons why countries form trade treaties. They recognize the
importance of credible commitment to economic reform, but they do not explore when and how
leaders would benefit from such commitments the most. Similarly, Ethier (1998) emphasizes the
value of credible commitment without examining individual leader strategy. Mansfield, Milner, and
Rosendorff (2002) argue that democracies use trade treaties to reveal their liberalization preference
to domestic audiences, but they focus on political institutions at the expense of individual leader
strategy. Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse (2008) focus on veto players. Bu¨the and Milner (2008)
and Manger (2009) argue that a PTA can increase FDI inflows, but they also do not theorize
individual leaders’ incentives in various circumstances.
Our contribution to the literature on domestic politics and international institutions is twofold.
First, we develop and empirically test a theory of the circumstances under which the domestic po-
litical benefits of joining PTAs are maximized. Second, we show that an association exists between
PTA formation and a broad range of important economic reforms. These findings provide a nuanced
explanation for when and how individual leaders benefit from joining international institutions that
promote economic reform, and how such decisions exert influence on domestic economic outcomes.
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3 Theory
Our theoretical argument links domestic politics to the idea that international institutions allow
credible commitment. The theory has four building blocks. First, democratization increases the
demand for economic reform. Second, new leaders are often unable to implement economic reforms
under democratization because their power is insecure. Third, PTA negotiations with a major power
can help leaders to promote economic reforms. Finally, we argue that both the EU and US may
expect substantial benefits from a PTA with an interested developing country. The combination
of these propositions implies that under democratization, new leaders have particularly strong
reasons to initiate PTA negotiations with the EU and the US. The main implications of the theory
are summarized in Table 1. According to the table, a PTA can be expected to induce economic
reforms when democratization coincides with leader change.
[Table 1 about here.]
3.1 Democratization and Economic Reform
Our first claim is that democratization increases the demand for economic reform.6 By democratiza-
tion, we refer to the enactment of political institutions that induce competition for office (Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010). We define economic reform broadly as policies that liberalize prof-
itable activities in various sectors of the national economy. This definition is not limited to trade
reform, and in fact an important contribution of our theory is to highlight the effects of a PTA on
services, financial policies, and intellectual property rights.
This claim is based on the idea that economic reforms can remove allocative and dynamic in-
efficiencies (Rodrik, 1992, 1996). Thus, they increase the productivity of the national economy,
allowing faster economic growth. The provision of economic wellbeing to broad constituencies is
necessary for political survival in democratic systems, so the government has greater incentives to
implement economic reforms, despite the fact that vested distributional interests incur some addi-
tional cost (Geddes, 1994; Haggard and Kaufman, 1997; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Przeworski,
6To be sure, many other factors may also increase the demand for economic reform. For parsimony, we focus on
democratization.
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1991; Rodrik, 1992).7 By contrast, autocratic rulers need only satisfy narrow elite constituencies, so
they have fewer incentives to implement risky economic reforms that may hurt influential political
and economic interests (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Weyland, 2002).8 As Milner and Kubota
(2005) empirically demonstrate, such incentives appear to have considerable empirical relevance in
explaining trade policies.9 More generally, a recent review of the empirical literature by Milner
and Mukherjee (2009, 165) shows that “democracy positively influences trade and capital account
openness.”10
Demand for economic reform does not imply that democratizing states can easily implement
liberalizing policies. As Keefer (2007) shows, newly democratized states have ineffective national
institutions that are susceptible to clientelism and corruption. Similarly, Clague et al. (1996)
demonstrate that transitional democracies do not generally perform well in generating economic
growth. According to Hellman (1998), liberalization attempts in transitional democracies often
become entrapped into a “partial reform equilibrium” that ultimately benefits elite interests at the
expense of the broader public. Thus, demand for economic reform does not automatically translate
into liberalizing policies. Instead, democratization creates political pressures to improve national
economic performance.
The South African experience following the end of the apartheid regime is illustrative. In 1994,
President Nelson Mandela faced a serious problem: the South African economy was geared towards
satisfying the needs of the white minority. The apartheid regime had maintained most enterprises in
direct state control, and the productivity of the economy was too low to satisfy the expectations of
the recently emancipated black majority. Thus, President Mandela engaged in extensive economic
reforms, especially in regard to privatization. They were also later deemed as highly successful in
an OECD (2003) Peer Review. Our theory is intended to capture cases that resemble the South
7To be sure, this assumption depends on the rationalist notion that citizens expect benefits from economic reform
and are willing to weather the potential costs in the short run. Following Geddes (1994) and Rodrik (1992), we adopt
this premise.
8As Olson (1993) argues, this does not imply that autocrats have no incentives to implement economic reforms.
Yet it seems reasonable to assume that ceteris paribus these incentives are stronger in democratic societies.
9To be sure, some benefits from trade reform to the citizens are redistributive by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
In this article, we examine reform more broadly so that the redistributive effects of trade reform are not as clear.




3.2 New Leaders and Economic Reform
What role does individual leader strategy play in this theoretical argument? We argue that new
leaders are dependent on credible external commitments to economic reform, whereas established
leaders are (i) better able to implement economic reforms by domestic means and (ii) may even
have fewer reasons to use liberalization as a political strategy. By a new leader, we refer to an
individual leader that has been recently elected in office and faces an uncertain political future. By
an established leader, we refer to an individual leader who has held power for a long time and whose
rule is stable.11
Why expect that new leaders may face different incentives than established leaders? First,
leaders with a long tenure are able to commit to economic policies and reform efforts if they, for
whatever reason, chose to implement them.12 Established leaders are not in immediate danger
of losing power, so their long time horizons allow credible intertemporal exchanges and promises.
By contrast, new leaders have yet to consolidate their rule, so their credibility is limited. Lack
of credibility is harmful to the economic benefits that reform brings, because economic reforms
cannot reassure investors unless the government is able to credibly commit to them in the long
run (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006).13 Additionally, lack of credibility may also prevent the new
leader from bargaining efficiently with domestic constituencies on the distribution of the gains from
reform ().
Previous research offers support for this assumption. For example, Clague et al. (1996) demon-
strate that autocratic leaders that have survived in office for many years can credibly commit to
contracts and property rights – core elements of any liberalization program. Similarly, Cheibub
(1998) and Li (2009) find that established leaders have fewer incentives to expropriate the assets
of foreign investors for temporary political gain. For these reasons, we argue that if an estab-
11To be sure, some new leaders may be consolidated while some established leaders may face stiff political compe-
tition. All else constant, however, new leaders are in greater danger of losing office (Licht, 2010).
12As Licht (2010) argues, this argument may not hold in established democracies. For present purposes, established
democracies are unimportant because they have the institutional means to credibly implement reforms.
13For time consistency, see Kydland and Prescott (1977).
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lished leader decides to allow democratization (perhaps under public pressure), he or she does not
generally depend on external assistance to implement politically expedient economic reforms. For
example, Schamis (1999, 238) argues that in Latin America, strong leaders have been able to im-
plement economic reforms with the support of elite constituencies who expected to benefit, both
during democratization eras and in other times. In such circumstances, it is improbable that an
established leader would have to reach out for external assistance to implement a reform policy.
Second, scholars of economic reform argue that new leaders may find it particularly difficult to
commit to liberalization. Haggard and Kaufman (1997, 277) emphasize that new leaders are in a
particularly difficult position when they have inherited past problems, confronting “a difficult and
politically unpleasant menu of economic policy choices” that was prompted by decisions made by
the previous government. Although the public may initially support reform efforts, “the transition
itself raises expectations that government will respond to new political constituencies ... policy
reform is difficult precisely because economic problems are more acute and demands for short-term
economic relief more widespread” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997, 277). Even in the absence of a
genuine crisis, they contend, “new democratic governments faced a different, but not necessarily less
serious, agenda of policy reforms” (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997, 278). In such circumstances, new
leaders may not have much time to exploit their initial popularity to push through economic reform
programs, unless they find a way to somehow credibly commit to liberalization and a distribution
of gains that satisfies their key constituencies (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006).
Finally, established leaders may often prefer not to respond to democratization pressures by
implementing any economic reforms in the first place, unless the situation is exceptionally severe.
Their power depends on serving entrenched distributional coalitions that benefit from state inter-
vention, so they might respond to demands for democratization by offering further concessions to
their winning coalition and preventing additional democratization (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;
Milner and Kubota, 2005; Przeworski, 1991).
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3.3 Preferential Trading Agreements and Economic Reform
If new leaders find it difficult to implement economic reforms, how are they to respond to the
pressures that democratization induces? We argue that a PTA with a major power can help the
leader in two ways. First, it can allow a credible commitment to reforms because backtracking
may result in punishment by the major power. Second, the promise of market access can help the
leader to compensate influential domestic opponents for their losses. We focus on major powers,
specifically the EU and the US, because these two economic giants include a wide range of reform
provisions in their agreements: from financial and service liberalization to to privatization and
improved regulations for foreign direct investment (Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir, 2009; World Bank,
2005). Thus, a PTA with the EU or the US is an ideal policy instrument for facilitating economic
reform.14
How can a PTA enable credible commitment to reform? A PTA can increase the cost of reneging
in several ways. First, it explicitly codifies legally binding rules that operate as a reference point
for international and domestic actors with an interest in compliance (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008;
Ethier, 1998; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). Second, a
PTA often contains enforcement mechanisms, such as a dispute settlement procedure that can issue
legal rulings on trade and other policies (Kono, 2007; McCall Smith, 2000). Third, reneging on
international commitments often carries adverse reputational consequences (Simmons, 1998; Tomz,
2007). Fourth, in the case of the EU and the US, the developing country is negotiating with a
major power that can relatively easily retaliate policy violations and inflict substantial damage on
the country in question. For these reasons, a PTA should ceteris paribus reduce the incentive of a
developing country to renege on previous commitments to economic liberalization. Finally, already
during the negotiations, the promise of a PTA, with provisions for market access to large markets in
advanced industrialized countries, can endow governments with incentives to implement economic
reforms that major powers, such as the EU or the US, demand.
The institutional design of US and EU PTAs offers ample support for this notion. Consider, for
14Developing countries are the appropriate sample for studying credible commitment to economic reform, because
they generally face greater obstacles and commitment problems than consolidated democratic regimes in industrialized
countries (Geddes, 1994; Rodrik, 1992; Keefer, 2007).
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example, intellectual property rights. We coded the design provisions of the PTAs in our dataset
that relate to intellectual property rights (IPRs). Based on a sample of 41 agreements, we found
that an EU or US PTA contains 5.2 legal provisions that specifically refer to IPRs. What is more,
every single one of them has at least one reference to IPR protection. Given that the vast majority
of other PTAs have few such provisions, this observation highlights the distinctive nature of EU
and US PTAs. Similarly, in this sample an EU or US PTA had on average 6.9 legal provisions
that refer to FDI liberalization. Again, the importance of FDI for the design of EU and US PTAs
demonstrates the relevance of the credible commitment argument. Finally, the inclusion of service
liberalization also supports this notion. Of the 41 agreements, only ten do not contain provisions
for services liberalization. Of the 31 that do, 20 contain a full chapter with detailed provisions for
services liberalization.
Practitioners also seem familiar with the logic of credible commitment. For example, the East-
ern Enlargement of the European Union was preceded by Association Agreements between the
union and future membership candidates (Vassiliou, 2007). Similarly, the International Trade
Administration of the US Department of Commerce emphasizes that “Trade agreements are also
a tool for promoting fair competition and encouraging foreign governments to adopt open and
transparent rulemaking procedures as well as non-discriminatory laws and regulations ... Trade
agreements may include commitments on topics such as ... [i]mproving intellectual property right
protection, [e]nhancing labor rights, [g]overnment procurement, [o]pening service sectors to com-
petition, [e]nhancing rules on foreign investment, [e]nvironmental standards, [i]mproving customs
facilitation.”15
The second reason why a new leader could promote reforms through a PTA with a major power
is the promise of market access. By beginning negotiations, the leader can offer foreign market
access to the domestic constituencies who may expect to lose from economic reforms. Although
the domestic constituencies may lose from the economic reforms per se, they have incentives to
consent to these economic reforms when the value of the foreign market access that they acquire in
exchange is high enough. Since the leader may also expect to benefit from opening foreign markets
15“U.S. Free Trade Agreements.” [http://www.export.gov/FTA]. Accessed February 23, 2010.
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to domestic exporters, both in the form of increased exports and through political support from
exporters, she can use PTA negotiations for a double dividend (Gilligan, 1997). Or as Pastor and
Wise (1994, 475) put it, “the set of potential supporters can widen as various interest groups accept
the costs from one government action in order to obtain the benefits of another part of the policy
package.”
An example of such dynamics can be found in Mexico. When President Carlos Salinas came
into power in 1988, he was faced with democratization demands and a relatively weak and unstable
national economy. While implementing various liberalization policies, such as privatization and
deregulation, President Salinas engaged in negotiations for the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA) (Manger, 2009). In addition to trade liberalization, NAFTA requires extensive
changes in FDI regulations, competition policy, services, and the financial system in Mexico. As
Krugman (1993, 18) writes, ”for his government, NAFTA is a sort of pledge – a pledge to foreign
investors that Mexican reform will continue (and that the U.S. market will remain open to goods
produced in Mexico). It is also a pledge to the Mexican population that better times are coming.”
Similarly, Cameron (1997, 122) argues that “US negotiators relied on market power ... if Mexico
wanted access to the largest market in the world, the Mexican government would have to be willing
to make the deal attractive to US investors and the US Congress by opening up new markets in
financial services, providing protection for IPR ... and liberalizing investment rules.” Consistent
with our theoretical argument, NAFTA combined economic reform with preferential access to the
vast US market.
The dual benefits of a PTA for economic reform has an important empirical implication: we
expect both negotiations and signature to facilitate economic reform. Negotiations allow domestic
bargains that garner political support for economic reform, whereas signature allows the credible
commitment by virtue of being a legally binding, formal treaty (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Ethier,
1998; Fernandez and Portes, 1998). In the empirical analysis, therefore, we consider both negotia-
tions and signature. Since the initiation of PTA negotiations is always a temporally prior decision,
we emphasize it.
On a final note, it is important to note that a PTA with a major power is by no means the only
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policy instrument that allows a leader to promote economic reform. While we have argued that
domestic policy instruments are difficult to use for new leaders, one may nonetheless expect that
a multilateral forum, such as the WTO, could allow a developing country to implement economic
reforms. We do not disagree with the substantial value of the multilateral trade regime for economic
reform, yet we argue there are good reasons to believe that multilateralism also has its limitations.
First, multilateral negotiations carry high transaction costs and may last for many years (Kahler,
1992; Keohane, 1984). Thus, the time to agreement may be too long for a new leader under
heavy domestic pressure to improve the performance of the national economy. This problem is
further amplified by the contentious nature of recent multilateral trade talks and the consensus
rules that the WTO uses (Steinberg, 2002). Second, the beneficial reform effects of the WTO are
maximized during accession negotiations. However, most developing countries have already joined
the WTO, and so conditional accession is no longer an option that their leaders can use to promote
economic reform. In sum, we believe that a PTA with a major power is a complementary strategy
to multilateral commitments. In the empirical analysis, we also account for the effect of WTO
membership and accession.
3.4 The Incentives of Major Powers
While our theory focuses on the incentives of developing country governments, PTA negotiations
require mutual assent. Thus, an essential scope condition of our theory is that the EU and the US
also have incentives to engage in PTA negotiations. Indeed, given the bargaining asymmetry that
characterizes the PTAs in focus, the importance of major power incentives is paramount. What
are the reasons why the EU and the US would generally want to negotiate PTAs with developing
countries?
We argue that the EU and the US may expect net benefits from PTAs because the policy
commitments enshrined in these treaties create profit opportunities for major corporations. As
both Bu¨the and Milner (2008) and Manger (2009) argue, PTAs generally increase FDI inflows to
countries that are potential FDI recipients. They do so by enabling a credible commitment to
liberal policies, by protecting IPRs, and by liberalizing important areas of the service sector. Thus,
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PTAs can be thought of as removing obstacles to profitable investments in developing countries.
Both the EU and the US have a high number of major corporations that are in a position to invest
in newly liberalized markets, and so these major corporations have incentives to lobby for PTAs
that allow developing countries to implement economic reforms that are otherwise unfeasible. For
example, NAFTA had a very large effect on inward FDI from the US to Mexico. In fact, as Manger
(2009) argues, the effect was so large that it induced major European corporations to lobby for
a EU-Mexico PTA, so as to avoid the competitive disadvantage vis-a´-vis major US corporations
due to preferential FDI treatment. Similarly, Cameron (1997, 119) argues that a primary reason
why the US engaged in NAFTA negotiations with Mexico was “to support the Salinas reforms to
encourage growth and political stability in Mexico.”
To be sure, this observation does not imply that the EU and the US do not pay any cost for PTA
negotiations. However, for our purposes it suffices that the EU and the US are generally willing
to engage in PTA negotiations, so that the leader of a developing country can at least sometimes
initiate PTA negotiations in view of implementing economic reforms that are otherwise infeasible.
Even if the EU and the US were constrained to some degree, with positive probability the leader of
a developing country is able to find a set of economic reforms that benefit both sides. This prospect
of mutual gain, we argue, enables PTA negotiations.
4 Empirical Implications
To test our theory, we test two falsifiable hypotheses against quantitative data. First, we have
argued that new leaders are particularly inclined towards responding to political turmoil by using
international institutions for enhanced credibility.
Hypothesis 1. Leader change increases the probability of initiating PTA negotiations under
democratization.
This hypothesis is the cornerstone of our theory. If there is no interactive effect of leader change
and democratization on the probability that a developing country engages in PTA negotiations
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with the EU or the US, the other hypothesis that we will present lose importance.
Why focus on PTA negotiations, as opposed to signature or ratification? The reason is that
PTA negotiations are by logical necessity the first move in PTA formation. A developing country
simply cannot sign and ratify a PTA unless it first agrees on the contractual terms in negotiations
with the foreign country. Thus, if a leader is to achieve credible commitment through a PTA, the
decisive move is to initiate the negotiations.
To illustrate, comparative historical evidence for this hypothesis is readily available. The Asso-
ciation Agreements that Eastern European countries have formed with the EU in the years following
the collapse of the communist rule were negotiated in a completely new political environment with
extremely high leader turnover rates. In many fragile Eastern European democracies, the prime
minister was replaced multiple times within one year. This included not only the most difficult
cases, such as Romania and Bulgaria, but also such countries as Estonia that were strongly inclined
towards the West from the very beginning.
Our second hypothesis is that PTA negotiations prompt economic reform in the developing
country especially upon leader change. While there are many reasons why leaders may engage in
PTA negotiations, we have argued that, especially for PTA negotiations with major powers that
are in a position to demand economic reforms, credible international commitments are critically
important. It is also reasonable to expect that PTA negotiations associated with leader change are
particularly prone to inducing economic reform.
Hypothesis 2. PTA negotiations and signature increase economic reform in developing coun-
tries.
Again, if this hypothesis fails, our theory that heavily emphasizes the importance of economic
reform is falsified.
Importantly, this hypothesis is not limited to cases of democratization and leader change (though
we will investigate such cases). If we are correct to argue that a PTA with a major power is a vehicle
of credible commitment, it follows that PTA formation should be associated with economic reform,
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regardless of the exact circumstances that prompted it. We are not claiming that democratization
and leader change are the exclusive reasons for economic reform, and so it would be inappropriate
not to investigate the association between PTA formation and economic reform in other instances.
For qualitative evidence on the importance of leader change for economic reform, consider
Jordan’s decision to initiate PTA negotiations with the United States in 1999. In that year, King
Abdullah II ascended to the throne following his father’s tenure of 47 years. By all indicators,
Jordan was in a state of economic disarray. Thus, King Abdullah II sought assistance from the
United States to reform the economy. Through pervasive liberalization, Jordan’s economic growth
dramatically increased and made the small country one of the most competitive in the region. As
His Majesty King Abdullah II (2000, 75) himself wrote in the Washington Quarterly, “I envision a
reform program that addresses the political, economic, social, and judicial structures and processes.
Any reform program that builds on the previous accomplishments will meet the challenges of the
future.”
What about the role of democratization? Let us return to the case of Nelson Mandela in South
Africa that we already discussed in the theory section. Recall that in that case, President Mandela
implemented a major privatization campaign to reduce the country’s reliance on state enterprises
that were geared towards fulfilling the needs of the white minority. One strategy that President
Mandela used was to engage in PTA negotiations with the EU in 1995. In addition to trade
liberalization, the resulting Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation (1999) requires
changes in the regulation of the services sector, beyond the WTO commitments of South Africa,
changes in competition policy, and capital movements liberalization.
5 Democratization and New Leaders: Research Design
To test our theory, we first conduct an analysis of the relationship between leader change, democra-
tization, and the initiation of PTA negotiations.16 Our unit of analysis is the undirected dyad-year.
Each dyad-year comprises a developing country i and a major power j, which is either the EU or the
US. We analyze 140 developing countries (as classified by the World Bank) and years 1990-2007.
16Reform effects are analyzed separately.
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The dataset is unbalanced since some countries, such as those from the former Soviet Union, enter
the dataset only after 1990. We end up with 4, 441 observations.
In the main text, we report results from a standard regression analysis. While we recognize
issues of endogeneity and selection bias, we do not use matching for the main analysis because
we would lose a substantial proportion of the data by preprocessing it. To boost confidence in
our findings, we also report results from various matching analyses below. The technical details
for these analyses can be found in the supplementary appendix. To foreshadow, the matching
research designs provide robust statistical support for our theoretical argument: in many cases,
accounting for the non-random assignment of the key independent variables actually strengthens
the substantive effects.
Following Cleves et al. (2008, 248), we estimate a survival model that can be written in the
log-time metric as follows:
ln(τij) = β0 + β1LeaderChangei,t + β2Democratizationi,t
+β3LeaderChangei,t ∗Democratizationi,t
+β4Controlsi,t + β5Controlsij,t + εij,t, (1)
where ln(τij) is the logarithmized survival time (until the initiation of PTA negotiations) between
developing country i and major power j. Generally, year is denoted by t. In the model, leader
change and democratization in country i, as well as their interaction, are the main explanatory
variables. The model will also include a battery of control variables, some specific to developing
country i and some to the undirected dyad ij. Finally, each βk is a coefficient and εij,t is the error
term.
5.1 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, ln(τij), is the logarithmized time in years t that country i ‘survives’ with-
out initiating PTA negotiations with major power j. To code the beginning of PTA negotiations,
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we opted for the official year that the negotiations started. Although we are aware that countries
may hold informal talks before the actual bargaining begins, it would be impossible to track system-
atically this information given the large number of countries in our dataset. Indeed, it seems safe to
assume that a very large number of countries are continuously engaged in preliminary trade talks on
some level, and so it is not clear that such informal consultations capture the reform commitment
incentives that we a re interested in. We collected the data on the initiation of PTA negotiations
using official EU and US sources, as well as the secondary literature. A list of PTA negotiations
and signatures is provided in Table 2. A full description of the sources for the negotiations data
will be posted as a supplementary appendix upon publication of this article.
[Table 2 about here.]
There are two main reasons why we decide to focus only on EU and US PTAs. First, these PTAs
are the most far-reaching trade agreements in terms of scope (Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir, 2009).
Beyond tariff reductions, the EU and the US are concerned with key trade-related sectors such as
liberalization of the financial market, strict rules on intellectual property rights, transparency and
anti-corruption laws, and free movement of capital. Second, the EU and the US are major powers
with the ability to punish developing countries for failure to comply with treaty obligations. Indeed,
the US and the EU have been important advocates of conditional agreements.17 As stated in the
Global Economic Prospects of the World Bank (2005), the US and the EU open their domestic
markets for developing countries, in exchange for liberalization of service markets in developing
countries and for acquiescence to rules governing investment and intellectual property rights. In
this sense, EU and US PTAs are ideal commitment devices for economic reform in developing
countries.18
No developing country has signed more than one PTA with the EU or the US, respectively, over
the period of investigation, so a dyad drops from our dataset immediately after the first negotiation
17By contrast, China and many other countries have formed shallow trade agreements that do not hold potential
for credible reform commitments.
18While we cannot capture nuanced distinctions between different PTAs, the use of a binary dependent variable
appears warranted. Additionally, we note that since we are primarily interested in negotiations, counting or charac-
terizing provisions would require the implausible assumption that the bargaining phase is characterized by perfect
foresight and complete information.
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round begins. In other words, we are dealing with a single-spell analysis. Our model explains 60
negotiation onsets during the period under investigation. We include both bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements, such as the EU-GCC PTA and the US-CAFTA PTA. However, since observations
are not independent in the case of multilateral negotiations, we also estimate the model without
any multilateral agreements. In this case, the number of negotiation onsets decreases to 46.
We also estimate the model without stable democracies, as the credible commitment argument
is weaker for them, given that they have had time to develop effective political institutions that
reduce the importance of individual leaders (Keefer, 2007; Licht, 2010). We consider a democracy
stable if it has continuously democratic for 10 years. By using such a lax criterion for democratic
stability, we basically stack the deck against our theoretical argument, as the set of remaining
countries turns out to be quite different from the full sample. A list of the 57 countries meeting
these criteria in at least one year can be found in the supplementary appendix.
5.2 Explanatory Variables
To test the first hypothesis, we need an independent variable that measures leader turnover.
LeaderChange is a dummy variable that scores 1 if a new leader came into office in developing
country i in year t, and 0 otherwise. For instance, this variable scores 1 if a new prime minister is
elected in a parliamentary democracy; a new president is inaugurated in a presidential democracy;
or a new dictator seizes power in an autocratic country. For these data, we rely on the Archigos
dataset compiled by Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009).
We do not lag LeaderChange because we focus on the instantaneous effect of leader change
on the initiation of PTA negotiations. Of course, this measure is potentially problematic: in some
years, PTA negotiations may be initiated already in months preceding leader change. To ensure
that our results are not driven by this coding decision, we verified for every positive observation of
the dependent variable in our dataset that there was indeed a leader change in the twelve months
preceding the initiation of PTA negotiations. Thus, for every instance of new PTA negotiations,
LeaderChange scores 1 if and only if there was a leader change in the preceding twelve months.
To be sure, we verified that all our results continue to hold if we also include leader changes in the
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previous year.
We interact LeaderChange withDemocratization to test our first hypothesis. Democratization
is a binary variable that records whether a country has allowed competitive elections within the last
five years (assuming it had not previously allowed them). For this variable, we use a dichotomous
measure for competitive elections. Data comes from (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010).19
To operationalize regime change, we follow previous research on democratization (Gleditsch and
Ward, 2000; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). Specifically, the variable Democratization equals
1 if a developing country changes from a non-democratic polity to a democracy, as measured by
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), between years t− 5 and t. It equals 0 otherwise.20
Some developing countries were not independent states during the Cold War, and so we were
unable to calculate the variable Democratization for them. To avoid losing PTA negotiations in
the early 1990s, we filled in the missing values for the 1980s as follows. First, we use the democracy
score of the Soviet Union for countries that were previously members of the Soviet Union. Second,
we use the democracy score of Yugoslavia for Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia.
Third, we use the democracy score of Czechoslovakia for Czech Republic and Slovakia. Finally, we
use the democracy score of Ethiopia for Eritrea. As a robustness test, we ensured that this coding
decision does not drive our results by allowing the missing data to disappear from our dataset.
We add several standard control variables to capture alternative explanations for PTA negoti-
ations. First, we add GDPperCapita to capture the income level of a developing country. This is
useful because a high income is positively correlated with the probability of PTA formation. Sec-
ond, GDPGrowth measures economic growth in a developing country. Third, we add total GDP
to measure the economic importance of a developing country.21 Fourth, Trade is the logarithmized
value of exports plus imports from developing country i to the EU or the US, depending on the
dyad, in year t − 1 in constant $US. Since a PTA is nominally a trade agreement, we use this
19We use data from Polity IV and from Freedom House as alternative measures of democracy. Our main results do
not change, as reported in the supplementary appendix.
20Our main results hold if democratization is measured over a period of 3 and 7 years.
21We use GDP instead of Population, another widely used indicator of economic importance, because the former
measure is available for a larger number of number of countries than the latter measure. However, since GDP appears
three times on the right-hand side of our equation, we replace it with Population (WDI data) as a robustness test,
and this has no effect on any of our main results.
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common proxy for trade relations. Data for these four variables are from the IMF.
We include several political variables in the baseline model. Most of these variables are lagged
by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. First, Alliance scores 1 if a developing country is an
ally of the United States in year t − 1 and 0 otherwise. As Gowa (1994) shows, military alliances
are positively associated with good trading relations. These data are from the Correlates of War.
Second, Democracy is a dummy variable that scores 1 if a developing country i is a democracy
at time t − 1, as measured in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Previous research has
shown that democratic pairs of countries sign PTAs more frequently than autocratic or mixed pairs
(Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff, 2002). Third, Y earsOffice, measures the number of years
that the executive stays in office. We obtain it from the Database of Political Institutions (Keefer,
2007). This measure allows us to separate the effect of leader turnover from executive tenure.
Fourth, we include Distance as another control of the importance of a developing country. The
data for Distance are from the 2005 CEPII dataset. Finally, we add the number of PTAs negotiated
by countries other than country i with the EU and the United States in the same geographic region
by time t (Mansfield, 1998). This captures the possibility that country i reacts to other agreements
negotiated with the EU or the United States (Manger, 2009). We label this variable Diffusion.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are summarized in Table 3.
[Table 3 about here.]
5.3 Model Specification
To estimate our servival model, one possible specification is the Cox proportional hazards model.22
However, the Schoenfeld residuals test clearly indicates that the proportional-hazards assump-
tion is violated. Particularly troubling is the fact that one of our main explanatory variables,
Democratization, deviates significantly from the proportional-hazards assumption, as shown in
the supplementary appendix. Thus, we opted for a parametric model. By the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC), we selected the exponential model.23
22Survival analysis is the appropriate approach because we are dealing with right-censored data [BECK 2008].
23See the supplementary appendix for technical details.
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Following common practice, we base our significance tests on Huber (robust) standard errors
(Beck, 2008, 486). These standard errors can account for possible heteroskedasticity, serial corre-
lation, or intra-group correlation in the data. To control for heterogeneity among countries, we
include regional dummy variables following a 2003 World Bank classification for eight different
regions. Sub-Saharan Africa represents the omitted reference category in the estimations.24
We verify the robustness of our model specification by using other accelerated failure-time
models, such as the Weibull and Gompertz distributions. We also estimate our main model using
a logistic regression with splines and the Carter and Signorino (2010) approximation to the hazard
rate, i.e. adding t, t2, and t3. In these cases, both splines and the time measure the number of
years without a failure (without negotiation). Finally, we estimate the main model using random
effects by dyad, or the shared-frailty model. Our main results do not change by using these different
specifications.
6 Democratization and New Leaders: Results
Our empirical analysis offers strong evidence in support of our theoretical argument. We find that
for all three samples – full, excluding stable democracies, and excluding multilateral agreements
– leader change has a substantively large (small) effect on the probability of PTA negotiations if
a developing country has (not) recently democratized. This effect is statistically distinguishable
from zero and clearly dominates the effect of standard control variables, such as income levels and
distance.
The statistical results are reported in Table 4 as hazard ratios. The first column gives the full
sample, whereas the second and third columns give the models excluding stable democracies and
multilateral agreements, respectively. As the table shows, LeaderChange has a positive effect on
the hazard rate for PTA negotiations, and this effect increases under democratization. The total
interactive effect cannot be directly read off the table, however, so we turn to a marginal effects
24We cannot use dyad fixed effects because many developing countries do not initiate PTA negotiations and because




[Table 4 about here.]
The total substantive effect of leader change, with and without democratization, is given in
Figure 1. We show it for each of the three samples. The figure shows that leader change has
a positive effect on PTA negotiations, with or without democratization, but the expected effect
is many times higher under democratization. Consistent with our theoretical argument, leader
change is a particularly critical factor in explaining PTA negotiations under democratization. If we
exclude stable democracies, leader change without democratization is also no longer statistically
distinguishable from zero.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The confidence intervals are much wider under democratization because both leader change and
democratization are relatively rare events, so that their interaction is a very rare event in the sample.
To verify that our results are fully robust, we replicated our empirical analyses using alternative
democratization measures (Polity IV, Freedom House) and different time periods (three or seven
years, instead of five). The results from these analyses can be found in the supplementary appendix.
It turns out that in every case, our main results continues to hold. For the other democratization
measures notably Polity IV, the results are actually even stronger. This is understandable, given
that the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) measure applies a very stringent criterion for
democratization.
The substantive effects are strikingly large. The baseline hazard rate for initiating PTA nego-
tiations in a given year, holding other variables at their means, is only 0.008, or less than one per
cent. Under leader change and democratization, the increase (first difference) is as high as 0.04.
Thus, the hazard rate is five time as high under leader change and democratization. It is safe to
say that the combination of leader change and democratization is a central explanatory variable
for PTA negotiations with the EU or the US.
25First, hazard ratios are not linearly additive. Second, the covariance of two coefficients cannot be seen, so
confidence intervals for the marginal effect of leader change under democratization cannot be construed.
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The control variables do not contain any major surprises. Following previous research, high
income levels and small distances are powerful predictors of PTA negotiations. By contrast, nei-
ther regime type nor population seem to consistently predict the initiation of PTA negotiations.
Population and military alliances also do not predict PTA negotiations.
In sum, these results demonstrate that leader change under democratization is a major deter-
minant of the timing of PTA negotiations between a developing country and the EU or the US.
While standard models largely focus on country characteristics to explain who engages in PTA ne-
gotiations, we capture some of the temporal variation by uncovering the effect of a discrete event,
leader change, on the initiation of PTA negotiations.
7 Preferential Trading Agreements and Economic Reforms
Leader change under democratization explains PTA negotiations, but it remains to examine the
association between PTA negotiations and economic reform. In this section, we report the results
from a structural-break analysis of data on reform indicators for developing countries that have
negotiated or signed a PTA. The technical details of the estimation and additional robustness tests
can be found in the supplementary appendix.
7.1 Estimation Technique
We conduct a structural-break analysis because it is very difficult to examine the causal effect of
PTA negotiations on economic reform using standard regression techniques. An obvious problem
is endogeneity, as major powers have incentives to negotiate a PTA with a developing country that
is willing to implement economic reforms. Additionally, developing-country leaders may negotiate
a PTA exactly because they believe it is easy to implement. A selection bias also exists in that the
developing countries failing to negotiate PTAs are systematically different from others. Finally, both
economic reforms and PTA negotiations increase systematically over time, so uncovering causality
is further complicated. Nevertheless, we can analyze structural breaks in reform data to investigate
the existence of an association or correlation between PTA negotiations and economic reform. A
structural-break analysis has the advantage of being relatively flexible and largely independent of
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the typical judgment calls in regression analysis, such as the choice of control variables and the
estimation procedure for standard errors. Thus, we can be reasonably certain that the associations
that we do observe were not derivative of invalid statistical model specification.
How can structural breaks be used to test our theoretical argument? We obviously cannot
analyze countries that never engaged in PTA negotiations, so our test focuses on the subsample
of countries that did engage in PTA negotiations. Within that sample, there are several outcomes
that would falsify our theory. First, it could be that there are few structural breaks in the data.
Second, we exclude consecutive structural breaks, except for the first one, so one possible outcome
is that structural breaks begin already before PTA negotiations. Third, since we have data on ne-
gotiations and signature, we can observe whether the negotiation phase is also relevant to economic
reform. Finally, we can compare the frequency of structural breaks with and without leader change
(conditional on democratization versus no democratization).
To analyze structural breaks in time-series data, we use a technique called rolling regression.
This technique can be used to identify structural breaks as follows.26 First, we form an estimation
sample of T consecutive years (in our case ten years, such as 1980-1989). For this estimation sample,
we regress the value of a reform indicator, such as privatization, on time. Thus, we are constructing
a linear trend in the reform indicator.27 Second, we use the estimated trend over these years to
predict the value of the reform indicator in the following year (in our case the eleventh year, such as
1990). If the prediction is precise, there is no structural break in the data. If the prediction is poor,
there is a structural break in the data, as the historical trend fails to explain the following year. We
repeat this exercise to predict the value of several reform indicators for as many years as possible.
For example, if we have data for years 1970-2007, we first use 1970-1979 as our estimation sample to
predict the value of a reform indicator in 1980. We then use 1971-1980 to predict the value of that
indicator 1981. Finally, we will use years 1997-2006 to predict the value of the indicator in 2007. If
we identify an upward structural break in the data during PTA negotiations or immediately after
26See chapter 9 of Zivot and Wang (2003) for a general introduction to rolling analysis in the context of financial
time series. We used the rollreg command in Stata for the analysis (Baum, 2005).
27We also tried a quadratic specification but found that it does not really improve model fit. Additionally, a
quadratic specification is problematic in that it allows a continuous approximation of a structural break, thus hiding
useful information.
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signature, we code it as a structural break.
7.2 Economic Reform Data
We use data on three forms of economic reform. First, we explore financial liberalization. Here we
use a new indicator, KAOPEN (Chinn and Ito, 2008), that includes four major categories on the
restrictions on external accounts: the presence of multiple exchange rates; restrictions on current
account transactions; restrictions on capital account transactions; and a requirement to surrender
export proceeds. This index ranges from -1.80 to 2.54 in our sample. High values of this variables
imply less stringent restrictions, or financial liberalization.
Second, since intellectual property rights (IPR) are a key issue in trade policy, we also emphasize
reforms in IPR legislation. We measure the number of legislative acts protecting IPR approved by
the national legislature in developing country i in year t, labeled IPRLegislation. High values of
this variable imply strict IPR regulations. The data are compiled by the authors from the World
Intellectual Property Organization dataset.
Finally, we measure privatization as the total amount of proceeds in (trillions of) dollars gained
by the privatization of companies every year t and divide it by the GDP. Data are from the World
Bank Privatization Dataset (Kikeri and Perault, 2009).
The descriptive statistics for the rolling analyses are found in Table 5. For each developing
country that has negotiated or signed a PTA, we report data availability for each of the three
reform indicators. If a cell is empty, the data were inadequate for a rolling analysis. Perhaps
the most important consequence of missing data was that we completely lost the following PTA
negotiations in Eastern Europe around the year 1990: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Romania. These missing cases stack the deck against finding evidence for our hypothesis, as post-
communist countries were clearly among the most ambitious reformers in the aftermath of the Cold
War (Vassiliou, 2007).
[Table 5 about here.]
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7.3 Results
The results of the rolling analysis offer evidence in support of our second hypothesis. First, for
the majority of developing countries that have engaged in negotiations with the EU or the US,
we found a positive structural break for at least one reform indicator during the negotiations or
within five years from signature. Second, if we divide the sample into developing countries that
engaged in PTA negotiations immediately after a leader change versus all others, we find that the
proportion of developing countries that implemented reforms during negotiations or after signature
is substantially higher when there was a leader change.
Let us begin with IPR legislation. We were able to conduct the analysis for 49 dyads. We found
clear evidence of a structural break for 20 of the 49 dyads. Of these, 11 structural breaks were
found during the negotiations and the other 9 within five years from signature. As an illustration,
Figure 2 shows the reform patterns for EU-Algeria (signature), EU-Poland (signature), US-Jordan
(negotiations), and US-El Salvador (signature).
[Figure 2 about here.]
What about capital accounts? We only found enough data to estimate the rolling model for
37 dyads. Of these, six indicated a structural break during the negotiations, so it seems that
the association between PTA formation and capital account liberalization is weaker than for the
other two reforms that we have investigated. As an example, Figure 3 shows reform patters for
EU-Chile (negotiations), EU-Egypt (negotiations), US-Colombia (negotiations), and US-Ecuador
(negotiations).
[Figure 3 about here.]
Finally, we consider privatization. We found enough data to estimate the rolling model for 37
dyads. Of these, 11 indicated a structural break during the negotiations and another 9 within five
years of signature. The findings are illustrated in Figure 4: EU-Macedonia (signature), EU-South
Africa (negotiations), US-Costa Rica (signature), US-Oman (negotiations).
[Figure 4 about here.]
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In total, we found that 30 of the 51 dyads with some available data showed a structural break for
at least one of the reform indicators. The fact that a structural break was found in approximately
60 percent of the cases, despite missing data for some of the most probable reformers in Eastern
Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is strongly consistent with our theoretical argument.
We also investigated conditional patterns. First, and most importantly, does leader change
mediate the association between PTA formation and economic reform? We found that if PTA
negotiations were associated with leader change, a structural break was found in 10 out of 15
dyads. Un the absence of leader change, a structural break was found in 20 out of 36 dyads. The
frequency of structural breaks with leader change was therefore 0.67, instead of 0.56 in the absence
of leader change, a substantial difference. Unfortunately, we were unable to find reliable reform
data for most instances of democratization and leader change using the stringent Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland (2010) definition. However, of the four cases that were amenable to a structural-break
test – Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – three (excluding Hungary) showed a structural
break in the reform data. Thus, the frequency was as high as 0.75.
Second, we compared the EU and the US. We found that an EU PTA was associated with
economic reform in 16 out of 25 cases whereas a US PTA was associated in 14 out of 26 cases. This
is a remarkable observation given that we lost most of the Eastern European countries that formed
an EU PTA in the early 1990s.
Finally, we verified that our results were not only driven by negotiations for WTO accession.
In our data, only 8 dyads joined the WTO while negotiating a PTA. Of them, six implemented
economic reforms. Thus, WTO membership appears to also drive economic reforms. But even in
the absence of WTO accession, in 24 out of 43 cases we found a structural break. Consequently, it
seems as though the multilateral approach to economic reform does not seem to be the only way
governments of developing countries use international institutions to promote economic reforms.
8 Additional Evidence
In this section, we provide additional evidence for our theoretical argument. First, we show that
trade liberalization is not sufficient to explain the effect of leader change under democratization on
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PTA negotiations with the EU and the US. Second, we report results from a matching design that
helps address omitted variable bias and endogeneity. Third, we examine an ancillary implication of
our theory: democratization without leader change should induce reform without PTA negotiations.
Finally, we discuss findings from another research project that demonstrates the powerful effect of
PTA formation on foreign aid by the EU and the US in key sectors, such as services.
8.1 Trade Liberalization or Economic Reform?
An important element of our theoretical argument is that new leaders should form PTAs to pro-
mote economic reform across different economic sectors, as opposed to simply focusing on trade
liberalization. While we cannot directly test trade liberalization as an alternative explanation, one
way to scrutinize it is to examine whether the combination of leader change and democratization
has a positive effect on PTA formation in general. If trade liberalization is the primary motivation
for engaging in PTA negotiations, the combination of leader change and democratization should
increase the likelihood that a developing country initiates forms a PTA with other countries as well
(not on the EU and the US).
In view of this hypothesis, we estimated our main model again but used all PTAs instead of
those with the EU and the US only. The supplementary appendix provides the technical details.
In sum, we found that the combination of leader and democratization has a negative effect on the
likelihood of PTA formation with other countries. This is exactly the opposite of what the trade
liberalization theory would predict, so it seems improbable that the combination of leader change
and democratization increases the likelihood of PTA negotiations with the EU or the US simply
due to trade liberalization aims.
8.2 Reform Consolidation
Our theory is based on the idea that PTAs can not only help leaders implement economic reforms,
but also consolidate them. Given that reform reversals are a common occurrence, an important
ancillary implication of our theory is that PTA formation should help leaders implement reforms
that will not be reversed in the future. Of the data that we used, cumulative IPR legislation and
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privatization revenue are not suitable for investigating reform consolidation because they do not
capture possible reversals. However, we can use data on capital account liberalization to investigate
the durability of economic reforms associated with a PTA. Of the six PTAs associated with capital
account liberalization, we found that the only one that saw a temporary reform reversal was EU-
Egypt. After Egypt signed the PTA in 2000, the KA index temporarily decreased decreased in
2002. However, it immediately rebounced back to the highest possible value in 2003. Thus, the
stability of capital account liberalization associated with PTA formation is consistent with our focus
on credible commitments.
8.3 A Matching Design
It might be argued that our treatment variable, i.e. the interaction between leader change and
democratization, is not randomly assigned. In other words, units receiving treatment and those
excluded from treatment may differ not only in their treatment status but also in other charac-
teristics. If these characteristics affect both the probability of experiencing jointly a leader change
and democratization, as well as the probability of entering into a PTA negotiation with the EU
and the US, our results are compromised by endogeneity and/or selection bias. To avoid these
biases, we implemented the coarsened exact matching (CEM) that “is a non-parametric method
of controlling for some of or all the confounding influence of pre-treatment control variables in
observational data” (Blackwell et al., 2009, 526). Matching drops observations from the data to
achieve a better balance between the treated and the control groups, “meaning that the empirical
distributions of the covariates (X1, X2, . . . , Xk) in the groups are more similar” (Blackwell et al.,
2009, 526). The technical details can be found in the supplementary appendix: suffice it to note
here that our main findings remain unchanged, as the estimation table and marginal effects figure
in the supplementary appendix show.
8.4 Democratization and Economic Reform
An ancillary implication of our theory is that democratizing countries should engage in economic
reform. While we are not in a position to analyze this issue empirically within the confines of this
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manuscript, we have already noted in the theory section that the extant literature on democrati-
zation and economic reform offers ample empirical evidence in support of this notion. In a recent
review, Milner and Mukherjee (2009) evaluate the effect of democratization on trade liberalization
and capital account openness. In regard to trade liberalization, they conclude that “most studies
report that democratization or higher levels of democracy has a statistically positive effect on trade
openness” while “large-n empirical evidence for the positive or negative effect impact of trade open-
ness on democracy is relatively weak” (167, 171). In regard to capital account openness, they write
that “statistical tests ... show that democratization and higher levels of democracy clearly have a
positive impact on capital account liberalization in developing countries since the mid-1970s” while
there is little evidence for the effect of capital account liberalization on democracy (174).
The evidence in regard to privatization and IPRs is scarce. However, the few studies that do
exist generally indicate a positive association between democratization and these economic reforms.
For example, Biglaiser and Danis (2002, 83) analyze panel data on privatization in 76 developing
countries, 1987-1994, and conclude that “democracies privatize more than authoritarian regimes.”
Similarly, Piquero and Piquero (2006) use data on software piracy in 82 countries, 1995-2000,
and find that democracies achieve lower piracy rates than autocracies. While these results are
preliminary and additional research is needed, it is notable how well they accord with our basic
thesis.
8.5 Foreign Aid for Economic Reform
Our theoretical argument is based on the idea that the government a developing country uses a
PTA to advance economic reforms that are also profitable for the EU and the US. In other research,
we have examined the effect of PTA formation on foreign aid given by the EU and the US to a
developing country. In that research, we showed that forming a PTA with the EU or the US has a
very large temporary effect on foreign aid inflows. Additionally, we used sectoral foreign aid data
from the AidData project to verify that the effect of PTA formation on foreign aid inflows is by
far the largest in sectors that hold considerable potential for economic reform.28 For example, very
28See http://www.aiddata.org.
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large foreign aid effects can be seen in banking services and trade adjustment assistance. These
findings are consistent with our theoretical argument here, as they indicate that the EU and the
US can use foreign aid to advance economic reforms associated with PTA formation.
9 Conclusion
We have investigated the possibility that developing countries engage in PTA negotiations with a
major power, namely the EU or the US, to implement economic reforms. We have argued that
new leaders facing difficult circumstances under democratization are particularly dependent on
the credible commitment and domestic side payments that international institutionalization, and
dealings with major powers in particular, allow. Thus, we have predicted that new leaders engage
in PTA negotiations especially under democratization, in view of implementing economic reforms
that benefit their core constituencies.
We tested this theoretical argument in several ways. First, we verified that leader change has a
very substantial effect on the probability that a developing country engages in PTA negotiations.
Second, we investigated how democratization conditions the effect of leader change on PTA nego-
tiations. These empirical analyses offer evidence in support of our theoretical argument. What is
more, the results survive an extensive array of robustness tests. Third, we examined the association
between PTA negotiations and economic reform through a rolling analysis of structural breaks in
the data. We found that PTA negotiations and signature are usually associated with core eco-
nomic reforms, from intellectual property rights to capital account liberalization and privatization,
and that this association is particularly strong for PTA negotiations that follow leader change in
a developing country. Finally, we conducted numerous additional analyses to further probe our
theoretical argument and exclude competing hypotheses.
This article contributes to our collective understanding of several core questions in international
political economy. First, we provide direct empirical evidence that individual leaders can use
international institutions as a vehicle of credible commitment. While scholars have provided a
theoretical rationale for this expectation, previous research has failed to empirically isolate the effect
of individual leader preferences and strategy (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006; Moravcsik, 2000).
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Second, we contribute to the study of trade treaties (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Manger, 2009) and
demonstrate that they may have important implications for economic reform well beyond trade
liberalization. In addition to these theoretical contributions, we offer some insight into how leader
change can be incorporated into statistical models of international political economy and present
new data on PTA negotiations.
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Figure 1: The effect of leader change on PTA negotiations with and without democratization in
the three samples (first difference, holding other variables at their mean values). The confidence
intervals are for the 95 per cent significance level.
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Figure 2: PTA formation and cumulative IPR legislation in four developing countries.
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Figure 3: PTA formation and capital account liberalization in four developing countries.
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Democratization Yes PTA, reform Reform, no PTA
No No PTA, no reform No PTA, no reform
Table 1: Expected policy outcomes in four different scenarios.
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Major Power Developing Country Negotiation Signature
EU Albania 2002 2006
EU Algeria 1996 2001
EU Bosnia 2005 2008
EU Bulgaria 1992 1993
EU Chile 2000 2002
EU Croatia 2000 2001
EU Czech Rep. 1990 1992
EU Egypt 1995 2001
EU Estonia 1994 1995
EU Hungary 1990 1992
EU India 2007 –
EU Jordan 1995 1997
EU Korea 2007 2009
EU Kuwait 2000 –
EU Latvia 1994 1995
EU Lebanon 1995 2002
EU Lithuania 1994 1995
EU Macedonia 2000 2001
EU Mexico 1995 2000
EU Morocco 1992 1995
EU Poland 1990 1992
EU Qatar 2000 –
EU Romania 1992 1993
EU Saudi Arabia 2002 –
EU Slovakia 1990 1992
EU Slovenia 1993 1997
EU South Africa 1995 1999
EU Syria 1997 2004
EU Tunisia 1994 1995
EU Turkey 1994 1995
EU Ukraine 2007 –
US Bahrain 2004 2004
US Bolivia 2004 –
US CAFTA-DR 2002 2004
US Chile 2000 2003
US Colombia 2004 2006
US Ecuador 2004 –
US Jordan 1999 2001
US Malaysia 2006 –
US Mexico 1990 1992
US Morocco 2003 2004
US Oman 2005 2006
US Panama 2004 2007
US Peru 2004 2006
US SACU 2003 –
US Singapore 2000 2002
US Thailand 2004 –
US United Arab Emirates 2004 –
US Vietnam 1995 2000
Table 2: Preferential trading agreements.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. of Obs. Source
PTA Negotiation .01 .11 0 1 4178 Authors
Leader Change .13 .34 0 1 4178 Archigos (2009)
Democratization .10 .30 0 1 4483 Cheibub et al (2010)
DemocratizationLeaderChange .02 .15 0 1 4483 –
GDPpc 2.66 4.14 .03 32.79 4178 IMF 2009
GDP 2.33 1.59 .10 7.88 4483 WDI 2009
GDPGrowth 3.32 6.76 -52.6 80.7 4178 Armed Conflict Dataset
Trade 8.26 5.36 0 16.58 4178 IMF 2009
Regime .43 .50 0 1 4441 Polity IV
Tenure 7.78 8.94 0 47 4228 DPI (2007)
Alliance .40 .49 0 1 4178 COW
Distance 8.86 .53 6.58 9.70 4178 CEPII 2005
Diffusion 4.03 4.53 0 19 4228 Authors
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the regression analysis.
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES PTANegotiation PTANegotiation PTANegotiation
Full Sample No Stable Democracies No Multilateral PTAs
LeaderChange 2.64*** 2.09* 2.67***
(0.83) (0.83) (0.97)
Democratization 1.07 1.00 1.23
(0.69) (0.77) (0.94)
LeaderChange*Democratization 2.76 3.07 2.57
(2.48) (2.87) (2.32)
GDPpc 1.06*** 1.09*** 1.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
GDP 1.42*** 1.36** 1.48***
(0.15) (0.19) (0.18)
GDPGrowth 0.99 0.99 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade 0.95 0.97 0.96
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Regime 0.78 0.82 0.87
(0.32) (0.42) (0.44)
Alliance 0.84 0.79 0.56
(0.28) (0.33) (0.21)
Distance 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Tenure 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Diffusion 1.13*** 1.11*** 1.09***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
East Asia 2.22 1.65 5.43**
(1.45) (1.38) (4.47)
West Europe 1.23 1.62 3.74
(0.78) (0.109) (3.03)
East Europe and Central Asia 0.36* 0.44 1.43
(0.20) (0.26) (1.03)
Latin America 0.81 1.50 1.76
(0.45) (0.101) (1.06)
Mena 1.54 1.57 3.88
(0.94) (0.106) (3.14)
Observations 4441 3412 4521
No. of Failures 61 45 46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: The effect of leader change on the initiation of PTA negotiations.
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Developing Country IPR Legislation Financial Liberalization Privatization
Albania 1990-2007 1988-2007
Algeria 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Bahrain 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Bolivia 1990-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Bosnia 1970-2007 1988-2007
Bulgaria
CAFTA-DR 1980-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Chile 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Colombia 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Croatia 1970-2007 1988-2007
Czech Rep. 1970-2003
Ecuador 1980-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Egypt 1990-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Estonia
Hungary 1970-2003
India 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007









Morocco 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Oman 1990-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Panama 1980-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007




SACU 1990-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Saudi Arabia 1980-2007 1970-2007
Singapore 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Slovakia 1970-2003
Slovenia 1970-2003 1996-2003 1988-2007
Syria 1990-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
South Africa 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Thailand 1970-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Tunisia 1970-2007 1988-2007
Turkey 1980-2007 1970-2007 1988-2007
Ukraine 1970-2007 1988-2007
United Arab Emirates 1990-2007
Vietnam 1970-2007 1970-2007 1990-2007
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the rolling regression.
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